Undocumented Speakers and Freedom of Speech; a Relatively Uncontroversial Approach by Wright, R. George
Undocumented Speakers and Freedom of Speech:
A Relatively Uncontroversial Approach
R. George Wright*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. IN TROD UCTION .................................................................................................. 499
II. STANDING AND SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS TO HEAR THE SPEECH OF OTHERS... 502
1I. RESTRICTIONS ON THE SPEECH OF UNDOCUMENTED PERSONS AS
IMPAIRING THE BASIC PURPOSES OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN GENERAL.....506
IV. Do THE EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS OF ALL PERSONS
UNCONTROVERSIALLY ADVANCE THE FREE SPEECH ARGUMENT? ....... . ... ... 509
V. CONCLUSION ............................................... 513
I. INTRODUCTION
The question of federal constitutional free speech rights for undocumented
speakers is generally unexplored in case law and in law review literature.2 The
underdevelopment of case law and scholarship in this area likely reflects an analytical
misstep. As it turns out, the analysis can be crucially misconceived if it is focused
narrowly and directly on the claimed free speech rights of undocumented speakers
themselves.
In contrast, the analysis below recognizes and develops the point that free speech
is often not simply a matter of speakers themselves, or even the content of their
speech, the conditions under which they speak, and the restrictions under which
speakers may labor. Free speech is not reducible to these elements or any
combination thereof
Crucially, free speech rights are what we may call complementary, or "inherently
relational." In any given context, free speech rights are held jointly and severally by
actual or potentially willing speakers and, equally, by actual or potentially willing
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis.
The author hereby thanks Maria Lopez, Jennifer Ekblaw, and Rachel Anne Scherer.
1. For as close as the case holdings apparently come, see a number of the authorities cited
infra Part IV.
2. For an extremely valuable but relatively narrow treatment focusing on "extraordinary
speech" of undocumented immigrants to law enforcement officials concerning primarily health and
safety code violations, and under the right to "petition the Government for redress of grievances," see
generally Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.YU. L. REv. 667, 667
(2003). For a sense of the scarcity of free speech decisions and free speech scholarship focusing even
on the broader class of all immigrants, documented or undocumented, see id at 714-15.
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listeners. Those actual or willing listeners, readers, or communication recipients are
the actual or potential audience for the speech in question.
Free speech rights are in this sense essentially complementary, or inherently
relational. They are held jointly by speakers and potential willing speakers and by
listeners and potential willing listeners, in equal measure. But for our purposes, it is
vital to notice that these complementary or relational rights may typically be
exercised severally, or in the ability of an audience to listen to a particular speaker.
More directly relevant for our purposes, a potential audience member may properly
object to restrictions on the speech of otherwise willing speakers.
Thus, where potential audience members hold certain free speech rights, those
rights may carry practical implications for the way the law should treat any willing
potential speakers the potential audience wishes to hear. The inherent
complementarity of free speech rights means that in certain cases, audience or
potential audience free speech rights will require what we might call pragmatic or de
facto speech rights, of whatever strength and scope, for all those persons the potential
audience wishes to hear.
More specifically, and most directly relevant to our concerns, there will be many
instances in which fully enfranchised adult United States citizen-voters and
documented aliens will wish to hear, on subjects of public interest, from some or all
undocumented persons within the United States. Merely for the sake of simplicity,
we shall refer hereafter to those who wish to hear from undocumented persons as
citizen-voters.
On some narrow or technical issues, it may be reasonable to wish to listen only
to some combination of documented immigrants, economists, sociologists,
politicians, advocates, joumalists, think-tanks, social workers, or other technical
experts.
But some citizen-voters will inevitably wish to hear from some or all
undocumented persons on a wide range of public issues. The point of listening to
some range of undocumented persons would not be to automatically override the
voices of documented aliens, of social scientists, or of citizens in general. The idea
would instead normally be to consider and weigh the distinctive contribution to the
discussion that the range of undocumented alien perspectives might bring.
Such an approach would be perfectly sensible as a matter of the general doctrinal
rights of willing audience members to hear potentially willing speakers. And such
an approach would also be consistent with the underlying logic of the values and
purposes of freedom of speech in the first place. It is perfectly defensible to believe
that traditionally cited free speech values, including the pursuit of truth and the
effective functioning of political democracy, among other such values,6 may be best
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part M.
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served by listening to any and all undocumented speakers, of whatever viewpoint, on
a broad range of issues.
In such cases, the uncontroversial free speech rights driving the analysis are those
of the willing audience. The idea of the citizen-voter as bearing free speech rights is
beyond question. And the free speech rights of a sub-set of citizen-voters, as a
potential audience, may well be violated if the undocumented speakers, that the
potential audience wishes to hear, are discouraged by the government from speaking.
Realistically, even after-the-fact sanctions on undocumented speakers, whether in the
form of technical punishment or not, may well discourage further speech.8
There may well be cases in which the clear and uncontested free speech rights of
citizen-voters are substantially burdened or simply violated by government action, of
whatever sort, that inhibits or somehow restricts the speech of undocumented
persons.9 In all such cases, the inherent relationality of free speech operates, in effect,
to confer certain "pragmatic" free speech rights on any or all undocumented persons
any citizen-voter may wish to hear.'0
This would follow regardless of the preferences of any particular citizen-voter.
Any citizen-voter may wish to hear from some or all undocumented persons, on a
narrower or broader range of issues, perhaps from some specific viewpoints, or not.
Some citizen-voters may wish to hear what amounts to a monologue from
undocumented speakers, while others may prefer to engage in dialogue or some more
pluralistic discussion. Free speech rights can be grounded in a potential willing
audience of as few as one person. But in the aggregate, when the preferences and
rights of all such citizen-voters are totaled up, the net effect will inevitably be, in
practical effect, what amounts to a substantial and robust set of free speech rights for
undocumented persons in general.
More precisely, the free speech rights of undocumented speakers do not arise and
disappear in immediate correspondence with any particular citizen-voter's wish to
hear or not hear from such undocumented speakers. The free speech right of
undocumented speakers may predate or anticipate a likely future expression of
interest by citizen-voters and survive any temporary abeyance of such interest. The
free speech rights of undocumented speakers may thus be based on undocumented
speech as an available resource, as distinct from merely an on-demand service.
7. See infra Part I.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part 1I
10. See infra Part IL While free speech rights generally do not require limitless government
subsidization, they also set some limits to governments' authority to discourage speech for particular
reasons. See, e.g., Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992)
("[G]ovemment ... may impose a permit requirement on those wishing to hold a march, parade, or
rally.... Such a scheme, however, must meet certain constitutional requirements.") (citations
omitted).
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These "pragmatic" free speech rights held by undocumented persons are no less
real and substantial even if any particular undocumented person chooses not to speak.
Correspondingly, citizen-voters do not generally have a free speech right to compel
undocumented persons to speak publicly if the latter would prefer not to speak. And
it is also clear that the "practical" free speech rights of undocumented persons remain
in effect if some, or even many, citizen-voters would prefer that they not speak."
After all, a citizen-voter's wish to hear a speaker or message, in an appropriate time,
place, and manner, is generally not subject to "veto" by some objecting party with the
ability to avoid listening.12
In any event, the argument below is intended to clarify, elaborate upon, and
otherwise strengthen this "relational" approach to undocumented speakers and
freedom of speech. As we shall also see, other approaches to the problem of
undocumented speakers are certainly possible, but they bring with them their own
limitations, complications, and controversies.13
II. STANDING AND SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS TO HEAR THE SPEECH OF OTHERS
We may start with the general principle that the constitutionally mandated
elements of standing and the prudential or judge-made aspects of standing are
commonly interpreted generously in the free speech area.' 4 This general principle
11. There are important limits on even the government's rights to compel speech by private
parties. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Bamette, 319 U.S. 624,633-34 (1943).
12. For a discussion of limits on a "heckler's veto" of disfavored speech, see Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See, e.g., Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988) (showing
concern for a chilling effect on speech unless prudential standing rules were relaxed in a facial
challenge case); Va. State. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57
(1976) (holding that would-be-listeners have standing to bring a first amendment claim to hear even
pure commercial speech from a would-be-speaker); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308
(1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing that the audience has First Amendment standing to sue,
given the importance of openness of public discussion); Kan. Judicial Rev. v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107,
1115 (10th Cir. 2008); King v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2005); Spargo v.
N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 83-84 (2d Cir. 2003); Essence, Inc. v. City of
Federal Hts., 285 F.3d 1272, 1287 n.13 (10th Cir. 2002) (First Amendment standing available for
litigant whose rights are "intertwined" with those of a third party non-litigant); Pittman v. Cole, 267
F.3d 1269,1283 (11th Cir. 2001) (applying First Amendment injury requirement loosely); ACLU v.
Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying ripeness requirement loosely in First
Amendment cases); Peny v. Village of Arlington Hts., 186 F.3d 826, 829-30 (7th Cir. 1999)
(requiring plaintiffs to show the existence of a willing potential speaker at the relevant time); U.S.
West, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999); Ruocchio v. United
Transp. Union, 181 E3d 376, 385 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that the standing doctrine is generally to be
expansively interpreted in First Amendment cases); Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972
(W.D. Wis. 2007) ('[P]laintiffs have demonstrated . . . that there are willing speakers who support
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applies across a range of aspects of standing and related gate-keeping doctrines.'5
This principle reflects the importance to our society of free, open, and unconstrained
debate in general, and the value of dispelling any potential "chill" or inhibition of
such debate as expeditiously as possible.' 6
On the merits, it is well established, with impeccable logic, that freedom of
speech generally is in large measure a matter of the rights of listeners and would-be
listeners. Crucially, the rights of listeners are not simply derivative of independent
rights of speakers: "More importantly, the right to receive ideas is a necessary
predicate to the recipient meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and
political freedom."17 The Supreme Court has recognized that "[f]reedom of speech
presupposes a willing speaker."' 8 Assuming such a speaker, "the protection afforded
is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both."' 9
Crucially for our purposes, the Court has denied any general principle that
"freedom of speech may be abridged when the speaker's listeners could come by his
message by some other means.... Nor have we recognized any such limitation on
the independent right of the listener to receive the information sought to be
communicated." 20 Thus it may be impermissible for the government to suppress the
ability of undocumented persons to speak even if the views and emotions of
undocumented persons could always be obtained from other sources.
Our point is again not that undocumented persons have free speech rights, and
that violation of those rights also burdens the free speech rights of interested citizen-
voters. It is instead that citizen-voters unquestionably possess the free speech rights
of listeners or information-seekers and would-be speech recipients, and that these
rights will often, as a practical matter, require pragmatic free speech rights of
undocumented speakers, particularly on matters of public import2 on which at least
their standing...."); Deida v. City of Milwaukee, 192 F. Supp. 2d 899, 904-05 (E.D. Wis. 2002);
Snyder v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 286 F. Supp. 927, 932 (N.D. 111. 1968) (three judge court)
("[W]e see no reason why the audience should be precluded from asserting their interests, merely
because the speaker is disinclined to wage a legal battle.") (citation omitted).
15. See cases cited supra note 14.
16. See cases cited supra note 14, in particular Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
17. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion). Pico, a public school
library book removal case, relies in part on First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783
(1978) (referring to a First Amendment right of "public access to discussion, debate, and the
dissemination of information and ideas").
18. Va. State Bd ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756.
19. Id. at 756-57 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974) (explaining the
lack of any necessity to consider any free speech rights of prison inmates themselves, given the free
speech rights of non-inmate correspondents)).
20. Va. State Bd. ofPhannacy, 425 U.S. at 757 n.15.
21. For the specially protected constitutional status of what the Court refers to as speech on
matters of public interest, see, for example, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417-18 (2006) (in the
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some citizen-voters will wish to be broadly informed. More concisely, guaranteeing
speech rights to undocumented persons is a matter of making some citizen-voter free
speech rights real and meaningful, in light of the basic purposes of the institution of
freedom of speech.22
This does not mean that undocumented persons are not properly subject to valid
immigration law and process whenever the free speech rights of citizen-voters would
be adversely affected thereby.23 It would be odd if immigration law, or prison law for
24that matter, were fundamentally driven by, and shaped even in detail by, the free
speech rights of citizen-voters.
But it would be equally odd to claim that immigration law, or prison law, has
absolutely no effect on the nature, meaning, and value of citizen-voter free speech
rights. Immigration law cannot be entirely insulated from free speech law. Imagine,
hypothetically, an immigration statute that prohibits anyone subject to a final,
unappealed order of deportation from communicating about their case, or any other
matter of public interest, with any journalist, publisher, or any other media. We need
not say that such a statute would be facially invalid, or should be denied application
in any particular case. And we need not assume any deportee free speech rights. Our
argument here is merely that in such a case, the free speech rights of the media, and of
the media's audiences, would be implicated, and should properly be taken into
account, to one degree or another, in denying any free speech rights of the deportees.
As a matter of realistic necessity, audience free speech rights in such cases would
imply practical free speech rights, of whatever strength and scope, on the part of those
subject to final orders of deportation. This logic would of course apply at least as
forcefully to undocumented persons not subject to such deportation orders, or not yet
even informally determined to lack documentation.
It is thus certainly not that any free speech interest must outweigh or trump any
immigration policy with which such an interest may be in tension. Rather, free
25speech interests of both speakers and audiences are often plainly of constitutionally
context of public employee free speech rights); Dun & Bradstret, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472
U.S. 749, 751 (1985) (in the context of firee speech limits on libel law); See also R. George Wright,
Speech on Matters ofPublic Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAULL. REv. 27, 27 (1987).
22. See infra Part li.
23. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 768-69 (1972) (Belgian Marxist denied
temporary nonimmigrant visa on grounds of advocacy of "world communism," despite the existence
of citizens inviting his domestic presence for an academic conference).
24. See Procunier, 416 U.S. at 398.
25. For further endorsement of the idea of free speech rights of audiences or potential
audiences, see, for example, Red Lion Broadcasting v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969) (stating that the rights of television news and editorial audiences are paramount over
broadcasters in right-of-reply context); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (citing a string
of cases in support of freedom of speech protecting "the right to receive information and ideas" in the
context of private possession of allegedly obscene materials); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381
U.S. 301, 305-07 (1965) (discussing a response card system regarding communist-oriented postal
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fundamental importance, and must be taken into proper account as far as those
interests extend.
It is important to note the range of circumstances under which the audience rights
of citizen-voters might be impaired by government policies affecting undocumented
persons. A wide range of government actions and policies, at various levels, may
operate to "chill" undocumented speech, whether the person's status as
undocumented has been formally established or brought to official attention or not.
Certainly, the fear of deportation may suffice to inhibit speech by undocumented
persons, whether the practical sanction of deportation would reflect official
disagreement with the content of the undocumented person's speech or not.26
Deportation, certainly, is generally considered a civil as opposed to a criminal
process.27 Thus deportation typically does not qualify as a punishment, 28 no matter
how "burdensome and severe" 29 deportation may be for the alien. But the risk of
deportation can certainly suffice to deter or inhibit speech. Government actions or
policies need not even be formal, let alone punitive in status, to inhibit free speech.30
And if the undocumented person's speech is "chilled," the interested citizen-voter
does not hear it.
As a leading expert has written of all categories of aliens in general, "[b]ecause
deportation is usually seen as a drastic penalty (at times, perhaps, more harsh than
imprisonment), aliens are likely to forgo speech condemned by the deportation
provisions. The immigration status therefore chills the exercise of First Amendment
mailings as burdening the addressee's free speech rights and the general public interest in
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public discussion and debate); King v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisoners, 415 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting prison's refusal to allow prisoner to obtain a
book on computer programming and stating, "[fjreedom of speech is not merely freedom to speak; it
is also freedom to read"); U.S. West, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th
Cir. 1999); Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1027 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1998)
(citing Pico plurality in context of public school mandating an allegedly discriminatory reading
assignment); City of Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1574 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Coffey, J., dissenting, in political canvassing restriction case); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town
of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1250-55 (3d Cir. 1992) (homeless individual challenging public
libray's access and behavior policies); Snyder v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 286 F. Supp. 927,
931-32 (1968) (concerning a statute prohibiting university facility access to allegedly subversive
organizations). Finally, in the "company town" context, see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505-06
(1946).
26. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 862, 868 (1989). See generally R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral
Regulation ofSpeech: The Limitations ofa Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REv. 333 (2006).
27. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952).
28. See id at 594-95 (quoting Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32,39 (1924)).
29. See id.
30. The classic case, outside the immigration context, on informal censorship through
informal governmental sanctions is Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1963).
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rights outside the immigration context."" And it seems fair to assume that what is
true for aliens in general in this respect will be typically no less true for
undocumented persons in particular.
III. RESTRICTIONS ON THE SPEECH OF UNDOCUMENTED PERSONS AS IMPAIRING THE
BASIC PURPOSES OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN GENERAL
As we have seen, recognition of "pragmatic" free speech rights of undocumented
persons, for the sake most fundamentally of the free speech rights of citizen-voters, is
more than a matter of narrow legal doctrine. The idea is built into the basic logical
structure of inherently related and mutually dependent speakers and audiences.32
But the logic of "pragmatic" or derivative free speech rights for undocumented
persons extends, more deeply, into the level of the basic reasons for constitutionally
protecting freedom of speech. Freedom of speech is not an end in itself. It is
protected for certain reasons.33 The idea is that freedom of speech honors certain
values or, even more importantly, tends especially to actually promote certain aims,
values, goals and achievements. 34
Several such aims are commonly cited. We shall focus, briefly, on those free
speech aims that seem least controversial and most important in accounting for the
link between the uncontroversial free speech rights of citizen-voters and the
realistically implicated "pragmatic" free speech rights of undocumented persons who
might be sought out by some citizen-voters as sources of information and insight.
Perhaps most obviously, freedom of speech can distinctively contribute to the
optimal functioning of a fully democratic, open, responsive, participatory government
and administration, at all levels.3 5 Under this rubric we may include some reasonably
31. See Aleinikoff, supra note 26, at 868. For a longer and more particular discussion, see
Wishnie, supra note 2.
32. See supra Parts I and II.
33. For discussion, see, for example, THOMAs I. EMERsON, THE SYsTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPREsSION 6-9 (1970); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REv 119, 119-
20(1989).
34. See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 33, at 6-9; Greenawalt, supra note 33, at 119-20.
35. For discussions of the important role that promoting democracy plays in the justification
of special constitutional protection for freedom of speech, see, for example, OWEN M. Fiss, THE
IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 2 (1996) (discussing the "First Amendment as a protection of popular
sovereignty"); ALEXANDER MEDGLEOHN, POLmCAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 27, 75 (1960) (1948) (first amendment primarily aimed at the goal that "all the citizens shall,
so far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life"). Notice in particular
how Professor Meildejohn's controversial limitation concerning political understanding by citizens
does not tend to undermine, and in fact is compatible with, our approach herein. Realistically,
citizens' full understanding of public issues requires unconstrained speech on such matters by
undocumented persons.
For a general critique of Meiklejohn's emphases, see STEvEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, DEMOCRAcY, AND ROMANCE 47-49 (1990); Robert Post, Meiklejohn r Mistake:
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stable yet adaptive balance between fundamental policy continuities and institutional,
cultural, and policy change. 3 6
The importance of broadly unconstrained public discussions to a genuinely open
democratic government has been recognized not only by theorists across the political
spectrum,3 7 but by the Supreme Court itself.38 The Court has emphasized the role of
the First Amendment "in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the
dissemination of information and ideas."39 Classically, Justice Brandeis asserted that
"public discussion is a political duty,"40 that "it is hazardous to discourage thought,'41
and that the Framers believed "in the power of reason as applied through public
discussion."42
The Court adopted a number of Justice Brandeis' themes in the classic public
official libel case of New York Times v Sullivan.43 Justice Brennan, for the Court in
Sullivan, famously recognized our "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."44 The
First Amendment significance and the practical value of promoting the broadest, most
Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1109, 1117-18
(1993). For further discussion of the promotion of democracy as a crucial free speech value, see, for
example, Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs.
J. 521, 574 (1977); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 23 (1971); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation
of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1, 16-17 (1965); Greenawalt, supra note 33, at 145
(citing ERic BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 23 (1985)). See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNTED STATES (Harvard Press ed. 1967) (1941).
36. For discussion, see, for example, EMERSON, supra note 33, at 7; Blasi, supra note 35, at
574; Greenawalt, supra note 33, at 141 (referring to the public interest in "interest accommodation
and social stability"). To the extent we rely herein on the particular free speech value of interest
accommodation and social stability, we do not wish to beg our primary question by merely assuming
that any proper accommodation of the interests of undocumented persons would grant such persons
general free speech rights within United States territory.
37. See authorities cited supra notes 34-36.
38. See authorities cited supra notes 34-36.
39. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (plurality opinion) (quoting First Nat'l
Bank ofBoston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
40. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (overruled in
part on other grounds, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,449 (1969)).
41. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
42. Id. at 375-76.
43. 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964) (quoting Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76).
44. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270-71 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). This
language from Sullivan has been widely quoted with approval, including in cases such as Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449,467-68 (2007); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S.
514, 534-35 (2001); id. ("[A] stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First
Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern."); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S.
661, 672 (1994); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990); NAACP v. Claibome
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,913 (1982).
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inclusive public discussion and dissemination of ideas has since been recognized in a
variety of contexts.45
This is not to claim that in these contexts the Court has recognized and endorsed
the free speech rights of undocumented persons in particular. That judicial fact does
not undermine our argument; it merely provides the occasion for, or makes necessary,
our argument herein. "[Ulninhibited, robust, and wide-open"46 public discussion,
even among citizen-voters alone, requires that appropriate weight be given to the
various preferences among some citizen-voters for access to a broad range of
undocumented persons' willingly expressed perspectives, including their experiences
and views on a broad range of public issues.
Those citizen-voters who are indifferent or hostile to such expressions have the
47classic remedy of not being compelled to listen. As the Court observed in Cohen v.
California,
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off
discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . .dependent upon a
showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an
essentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this authority
would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a
matter of personal predilection.48
Of course, our focus herein is not precisely on the silencing of undocumented
persons, but on the silencing of their invited discourse and on, directly, the free speech
rights of those citizen-voters whose access to invited undocumented perspectives
would be impaired.
Related, but certainly worthy of separate mention, is the role of the widely
recognized free speech value of the pursuit of truth.49 There is no evidence that
45. See, e.g., supra note 44; see also SIR ERNEST BARKER, REFLECTONs ON GOVERNMENT
412 (1942) ("Democracy must enlist the thought of the whole community in a process of
discussion....").
46. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
47. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,21 (1971) (noting that "[t]hose in the Los Angeles
courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their
eyes" from the allegedly offensive language of a political message on defendant's jacket in court
building).
48. Id.
49. The classic cite to the pursuit of truth as a purpose of freedom of speech is JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERrY 76-77 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1974) (1859). For a range of contemporay
discussions of the pursuit of truth as a free speech value, see, for example, FREDERICK SCHAUER,
FREE SPEECH: APHILOSOPHICALENQUIRY 15 (1982); Genawalt, supra note 33, at 130-33; William
P. Marshall, In Defense ofthe Searh for Truth as a First Amendnent Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1,
1 (1995); Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory ofFree Expression, 60 S.
CAL. L. REv. 649, 655 (1987); Christopher T. Wonnell, Truth and the Marketplace ofIdeas, 19 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 669, 670 (1986) ("Historically, . . . one of the most important defenses of freedom of
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undocumented immigrants are widely incapable of contributing distinctively to the
search for truth about immigration policy, in its experiential or its more objective
dimensions, or for that matter, on any matter of public interest. But even this easily-
met standard exceeds what is necessary to advance our thesis in this narrow respect.
All our thesis requires is that some percentage of citizen-voters believe that
undocumented willing speakers are capable at various times of usefully contributing
to an ongoing or anticipated public discussion at any governmental level. Any more
demanding standard, as noted above in connection with the free speech value of
democracy,so would violate the Court's clear desire in Cohen1 not to empower
52censorious majorities.
IV. Do THE EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS OF ALL PERSONS UNCONTROVERSIALLY
ADVANCE THE FREE SPEECH ARGUMENT?
It is clearly established that the scope of both due process 53 and equal
protection 54 encompass not merely all citizens, but all "persons"" within the
speech has been its alleged role in advancing the pursuit of truth.").
50. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
52. There are other arguably relevant free speech values, including those of self-realization
and tolerance. See Brian Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 Hary. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 443, 445-46 (1998); Martin H. Redish, The Value ofFree Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 593
(1982), and LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA 9 (1986). But merely for the sake of the simplicity and reduced controversiality
of the argument, we assume that focusing on these particular values as undergirding freedom of
speech would add little weight to the arguments above, or else would be seen as biased in favor of
pragmatic, if not formal, free speech rights for undocumented persons, in some question-begging
way.
53. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976) (permitting distinctions among
classes of resident aliens for Medicare benefits eligibility purposes; observing that simply because
"all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the
further conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship or, indeed, to
the conclusion that all aliens must be placed in a single homogeneous legal classification"); Kim Ho
Ma v. Ashcroft 257 F.3d 1095, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77 (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The court in Kim Ho Ma noted:
[here are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The
Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of those
persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Even one
whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that
constitutional protection.
Id. If we say that undocumented persons have various property and liberty interests,
perhapsincluding liberty of speech, protected as a matter of due process, we must presumably be able
to specify the source or origin of such recognized interests. Cf Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972) (for due process purposes, property interests created not by the Constitution itself, but
"created and their dimensions . . . defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
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jurisdiction. One might imagine, on this basis, that if undocumented immigrants
were to count as "persons" within the jurisdiction, the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause, perhaps through the idea of "incorporation" of earlier amendments,
the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, and the Fifth Amendment due
process clause or its equal protection "component"7 might uncontroversially smooth
the path to free speech rights of undocumented persons as against state and federal
actors.
One obstacle, at least of a formal nature, for such arguments is that the First
Amendment does not clearly and unequivocally indicate the class of free speech right
58holders. By its terms, the First Amendment simply bars Congress from abridging
an apparent institution referred to as "the freedom of speech."59 The scope of
protected speakers is not otherwise specified. The freedom of speech protected
therein could be that of 'persons' or perhaps of 'the people.' 60  This unresolved
uncertainty does not advance the case for the free speech rights of undocumented
persons in an uncontroversial way.
Based on the text of the First Amendment, it is thus possible to argue that
undocumented persons, either as an entirety, or those of only minimal or transient
United States residency, do not fall within the scope of constitutionally protected
speakers. It is difficult to imagine that the distinction between documented and
undocumented aliens was especially meaningful, let alone important, in the historical
independent source such as state law").
54. See, e.g, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212-15 (1982) (regarding equal protection rights
of undocumented immigrant children in the context of public school access); Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973) ("It is established, of course, that an alien is entitled to the shelter of the
Equal Protection Clause.") (citing, inter alia, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
55. For a survey of the scope of "persons," in various contexts, under the federal
Constitution, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-58 (1973).
56. For a crucial discussion of the selective incorporation of a variety of constitutional rights
into the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, and thus made binding against the
states in favor of all Fourteenth Amendment "persons," see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-
49(1968).
57. For discussion, see United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (claiming
selective prosecution based on race); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (federal
counterpart to state public school desegregation cases).
58. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
59. For discussion, see Mark P. Denbaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1156, 1156 (1986).
60. For discussion of possible meanings of the references to "the people" elsewhere in the
First Amendment, as well in the Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, see United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265, 266-67 (1990) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that "the
people" generally refers to "a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community").
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adoption of the language of the First Amendment in general, or the free speech clause
in particular61
Let us assume, though, that undocumented, along with documented, immigrants
count as "persons" under the equal protection clause, as cases such as Plyler v. Doe62
evidently establish. From the premise that both documented and undocumented
aliens are persons for equal protection or due process purposes, it still might be
controversial to infer that undocumented persons, along with documented persons,
should hold free speech rights. Some substantive argument to that effect would then
still be necessary.
Such a substantive argument would be necessary because of the general principle
that, for some purposes, it is constitutionally permissible to treat different classes of
aliens differently, and to accord different rights to different classes of aliens.
Certainly, there is case authority at least casually recognizing free speech rights for
"aliens" as a general classification. 4 But the leading cases recognizing free speech
rights for aliens have, up to this point, apparently involved aliens who have entered
the United States in some documented status.65
Certainly, an argument from the equal protection rights of undocumented
persons to the free speech rights of such persons can be made under the logic of
61. Professor Gerald Neuman has taken issue with the idea that for the first century post-
Independence, federal and state law typically placed only minimal limits on immigration. See Gerald
L. Neuman, The Lost Century ofAmerican Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 1833,
1833-35 (1993). But Professor Neuman himself writes that "[t]he myth of an era of unrestricted
immigration to the United States is so widespread in the legal literature that authors cited to illustrate
it need feel no individual embarrassment." Id. at 1835. Professor Neuman acknowledges that
"[n]either Congress nor the states attempted to impose quantitative limits on immigration." Id at
1834.
62. 457 U.S. 202,215 (1982).
63. See, e.g., American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1063-64
(9th Cir. 1995) ("The Supreme Court has consistently distinguished between aliens in the United
States and those seeking to enter from outside the country...."); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78
(1976) ('The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause
does not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens . .. must be placed in a single homogeneous
legal classification."); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271 (quoting Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,
344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953)) (distinguishing between lawfully admitted and non-lawfully admitted
entrants for purposes of Bill of Rights protection).
64. See, eg., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (citing Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941)).
65. Harry Bridges, the named party in the cases cited supra note 64, was for many years a
nationally prominent West Coast docks labor leader who, despite deportation litigation with an
explicit political content, would not have been considered an undocumented immigrant. For
discussion of a wide range of related topics, see the website of the University of Washington's Hany
Bridges Center for Labor Studies, available at http://depts.washington.edu/pcls (last visited Dec. 25,
2009). Unsurprisingly, the Court in Wxon, 326 U.S. at 148, refers merely and without differentiation
to "aliens." The more recent case of Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271, refers explicitly to the rights
of "resident aliens" in Wixon.
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Plyler. Plyler recognizes the equal protection rights of undocumented students.66 The
Court, after rejecting a strict scrutiny test in similar cases67 because of the alterability
of undocumented status,' appears to adopt, at least for the unique circumstances in
Plyler,6 an especially rigorous balancing-oriented form of minimum scrutiny.70 This
form of minimum scrutiny seems to require something like a "substantial"7' state
regulatory interest, and to allow for a certain resistance by reviewing courts to the
state's evidence and reasoning. 2 Presumably the unusual rigor of the equal
protection review in Plyler largely reflects the sense that the practical stakes in these
73 74cases are unusually high, and a past of insufficient federal leadership on the issue.
Thus, Plyler established meaningful equal protection rights for undocumented
children, at least in the narrow and practically crucial context of access to public
schools.75 And at this point, it would thus be entirely reasonable to say that any
attempt by a public school official to censor the speech of an undocumented student,
on the grounds of that student's undocumented status, would inevitably raise an equal
protection argument that implicated a right to speak.
The basic logic of this transition from an undocumented student's enforceable
constitutional equal protection right to attend public school to some minimal degree
of indirect free speech protection in school for that undocumented student seems clear
enough. The undocumented student, under Plyler, has an enforceable constitutional
equal protection right to attend an established public school system on basically equal
terms with other students. Suppose two students, one undocumented and one not,
were disciplined for distributing political literature on school grounds. As a matter of
equal protection under Plyler, would we want to apply the standard Tlnker 7 free
66. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211 (1982).
67. See id at 219 n.19, 223.
68. See id. at 220.
69. These circumstances would include the crucial practical, though not federal
constitutional, status of a public school education, as well as the status of practically blameless
undocumented children who might remain within the country as something of a permanent
underclass if denied an education. See id. at 213, 221, 223-24.
70. See id at 224,225 (referring to "an equal protection balance").
71. See id at 224.
72. See the majority's "rebuttals" to the various state interest arguments, id. at 227-30.
73. See supra note 69.
74. See Plyer, 457 U.S. at 242 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("The Court makes no attempt to
disguise that it is acting to make up for Congress' lack of 'effective leadership' in dealing with the
serious national problems caused by the influx of uncountable millions ... across our borders.").
75. See id. at 215.
76. The right must be provided on equal terms, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954), despite the denial of a fundamental federal constitutional right to an education itself. San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
77. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969)
(permitting restriction of public school students' political speech on a substantial showing of actual or
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speech test in the case of the documented student, but no free speech test at all in the
case of the otherwise similarly situated undocumented student? Might granting
Tinker protection to one student's speech, but lesser or no protection to the
undocumented student's speech, on grounds of undocumented status, violate the
undocumented student's equal protection rights under Plyler? Must we read Plyler as
recognizing attendance rights for undocumented students, but absolutely no free
speech rights while duly enrolled?
Even though this argument seems sound , it cannot not be herein relied upon
because it is controversial how far the argument actually goes. Plyler, after all, may
rest at least in part on the predictably disastrous consequences of large numbers of
unschooled adults.78 It would be less plausible to predict disastrous consequences if
undocumented student speech rights were determined solely by state statute or local
rule, rather than by the First Amendment. Some might well read Plyler to require
only minimum scrutiny equal protection in the case of restrictions on the public
school speech of undocumented students. Or perhaps Plyler should be read to protect
undocumented students' speech rights only where the students' ability to attend
school is implicated.
Even if we read Plyler, sensibly, to require something like the linker free speech
test for undocumented students where it is similarly applied to documented students,
it remains controversial how far Plyler & equal protection rights should be extended to
undocumented persons generally in various non-school contexts. Our approach, by
contrast, is admittedly indirect. But our approach does have the advantage of a less
controversial and more robust appeal to the free speech rights, as listeners, of citizen-
voters. It is difficult to imagine courts' generally concluding that the free speech
rights of citizen-voters who wish to hear undocumented speakers should evoke only
minimum scrutiny in their defense.79 For these reasons, we have thus chosen not to
place much reliance on Plyler & equal protection logic to generally validate
undocumented free speech rights.
V CONCLUSION
The uncontroversial free speech rights of individual citizen-voters, as willing
potential listeners to a range of potentially willing undocumented speakers on a
plethora of subjects, imply pragmatic free speech rights to undocumented speakers.
What, though, are the distinctive limits of such pragmatic free speech rights?
For one thing, if we assume a settled immigration law, the free speech rights of
citizen-voters, as individuals, cannot realistically be expected to trump any limitation
on the immediate physical presence of any willing speaker from anywhere around the
likely disruption, disturbance, disorder, or violation of unspecified rights of others).
78. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
79. Consider, for example, the more demanding tests variously applied in the case of
listener, viewer, or reader rights in the cases cited supra note 25.
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world.80 A particular citizen's desire to hear a willing speaker from a foreign country,
in face-to-face conversation, will, of course, not typically overturn otherwise valid
immigration law.
Additionally, any approach, such as ours, that focuses on undocumented speech
communication directly or indirectly with citizens-voters, will leave other sorts of
valuable speech by undocumented persons protected only on more complex grounds,
or only through the separate constitutional protection of due process and against
unreasonable searches and seizures.si What of the free speech status of, say, notes
taken by an undocumented person? Private conversations between and among
undocumented persons, as well as materials such as computer files, phone records
and diary entries by undocumented persons, could be protected from unreasonable
searches and seizures, or sometimes more directly as preparatory to later direct or
indirect discussion with one or more citizen-voters. 82
We may conclude by noting explicitly that we have typically assumed
throughout, for the sake of simplifying the argument, that all undocumented persons
can be instantly and uncontroversially recognized as "undocumented" for free speech
purposes. In many cases, however, a free speech argument may crystallize before
there is any sort of administrative or judicial determination, let alone a final judgment,
that the speaker in question is in any sense undocumented. 3 Often, the government
official restricting the speech at issue will have no special competence or jurisdiction
80. See generally Title 8, Chapter 12 of the United States Code on immigration priorities
and procedures. We need have no quarrel here with the actual current scope of what is known as the
"plenary power" doctrine in immigration law. See generally T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF,
SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERUCAN CmzENsHIP Ch. 7
(2002); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years ofPlenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the
Courts, 22 HAsTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 925 (1995); Maria Pab6n L6pez, A Tale of Two Systems:
Analyzing the Treatment of Noncitizen Families in State Family Law Systems and Under the
Immigration Law System, 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 229,238 (2008). For our purposes, we may grant
an unfettered congressional power to legally exclude aliens outside the United States from physically
entering the United States, or to condition their entry upon constitutionally permissible grounds
related to speech. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 756-66 (1972); W. Aaron Vandiver,
Checking Ideas at the Border: Evaluating the Possible Renewal ofldeological Exclusion, 55 EMoRY
L.J. 751, 751 (2006). Free speech law should presumably not drive basic decisions as to who should
be officially allowed to enter the United States. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. But the
plenary power doctrine does not deny all enforceable federal constitutional rights, formally or
pragmatically, to undocumented persons within the United States. See, e.g., the discussion of Plyler,
supra Part IV.
81. For discussion, see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271-72 (1990);
Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2001).
82. For a case of protected speech involving a private drawing, sketched at home and
inadvertently brought to school by another person, see Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d
608, 611 (5th Cir. 2004).
83. See, e.g, Lopez v. Town of Cave Creek, Ariz., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1031 (D. Ariz.
2008) (ordinance prohibiting roadside solicitation of employment challenged on free speech grounds
by numbers of "day laborers," with no reference in the case to any undocumented workers).
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84over immigration matters. The undocumented status we have been assuming
throughout must not be casually assumed by officials who may be inclined to restrict
speech. In this respect, much of this Essay has in effect conservatively assumed that
justifying restrictions on the speech of undocumented persons is easier than it actually
is.
84. Nor will it always be obvious to law enforcement officials whether the speech involved
is itself illegal under state or federal law, even assuming the speaker to be undocumented. For
discussion, see, for example, Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach,
475 F. Supp. 2d 952, 957 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Kathryn Nicole Lewis, Streets of Wrath: The
Constitutionality ofthe Town ofJupiterk Non-Solicitation Ordinance, 37 STETSON L. REv. 471, 500-
01(2008). Logically, if undocumented persons have no state or federal firee speech rights, it should
not be necessary to hold any hearing or apply any test when any concededly undocumented person
exclusively raises any free speech claim or defense. Any judicial temptation to ever hold such a
hearing, it is fair to imagine, may bespeak a judicial sense that such a rule is intuitively objectionable.
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